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1. Introduction 
 
The enlightening contributions by Condorelli and d’Argent pub-
lished in this review both serve to stimulate the debate on the possible 
‘dual attribution’ of conduct in peacekeeping operations. The perspec-
tives of the two authors are different, but they both provide some ‘food 
for thought’ as far as the interpretation of Article 7 of the Articles on 
the Responsibility of International Organizations (hereinafter ARIO) is 
concerned. 
In this brief paper I would like to discuss one of the aspects dealt 
with in the papers in connection with the judgments rendered by the 
Dutch Courts in the Nuhanovic saga, that is to say the ‘reciprocal’ ap-
proach followed by the Court of Appeal in the application of the ‘effec-
tive control’ standard. It is useful to recall that the appeal judges in The 
Hague assumed that the ‘effective control’ criterion enshrined in Article 
7 ARIO applied not only to the ‘hiring’ international organization (here-
inafter IO), but also to the troop-contributing States (hereinafter TCS)1 
as suggested by the International Law Commission (hereinafter ILC).2 
The District Court of The Hague confirmed this view in the recent 
* Research fellow in International Law, Université de la Vallée d’Aoste. 
1 Hasan Nuhanovic v Netherlands, Appeal judgment, LJN:BR5388, ILDC 1742 (NL 
2011) (Court of Appeal, 5 July 2011) para 5.8. 
2 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 63rd Ses-
sion (26 April-3 June and 4 July-12 August 2011) UN doc A/66/10, 85, para 4. 
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judgment in the Mothers of Srebrenica case,3 in which the Netherlands 
was found to be responsible for the death of 300 men in Srebrenica.4 
Pierre d’Argent, in his paper, criticises the ‘reciprocal’ approach fol-
lowed by the Court of Appeal, arguing that the ‘effective control’ test 
should be applied only to the IO because: ‘in the absence of effective 
control by the organization over the conduct of the State organ placed 
at its disposal, such conduct must be considered as an act of that State, 
and of that State only’.5 It derives from this critique that it is: 
 
‘superfluous to assess whether the State exercised effective control 
since the person placed at the disposal of the organization is its organ 
and that State responsibility for conduct of organs is not conditioned 
by the positive assessment of any effective control by the State over the 
conduct of its organ’.6  
 
This proposition deserves some discussion as it deals with an im-
portant – if not fundamental – issue in the continuous quest for a feasi-
ble interpretation of Article 7 ARIO. In fact, the application or non-
application of the ‘reciprocal’ approach can have a heavy weight on the 
attribution of conduct in peacekeeping operations. 
I will deal with this issue in the next section, arguing that the non-
application of the ‘reciprocal’ approach can result in a presumption in 
favour of the attribution to the TCS. In the third section I will then dis-
cuss some arguments in support of the judgment rendered by Court of 
Appeal in the Nuhanovic case, in order to draw some general conclu-
sions in the last paragraph. 
 
 
 
3 See Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica et al v Netherlands, Judgment (District Court, 
16 July 2014) paras 4.33 – 4.35 available at <http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl>. 
4 For an early comment see B Boutin, ‘Dutch Court Holds the Netherlands Re-
sponsible for 300 Srebrenica Deaths, and Sets Limits to Future Claims’ (2014) available 
at <www.sharesproject.nl>. 
5 P d’Argent, ‘State Organs Placed at the Disposal of the UN, Effective Control, 
Wrongful Abstention and Dual Attribution of Conduct’ (2014) Questions of Interna-
tional Law Zoom-in 1, 26 available at <www.qil-qdi.org>. 
6 ibid. 
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2. Is there a presumption in favor of the attribution to the troop-
contributing States? 
 
Pierre d’Argent argues that in the absence of effective control exer-
cised by IOs, the conduct should be attributed to the TCS according to 
the ‘default attribution rule’7 because the troops still remain de jure or-
gans of their sending countries; hence, the conduct is to be attributed to 
the TCS according to Article 4 Articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter ARSIWA).8 He applies 
this view to the decision of Major Franken relating to the separation of 
the Nuhanovic family, asserting that: 
 
‘deciding the case on the basis of Article 7 ARIO could have been 
more straightforward: as he was not “fully seconded” to the UN but 
only placed at its disposal, his decision must be legally deemed to re-
main a decision of the State of which he was an organ, unless it can be 
convincingly established that the UN (through its own agents and or-
gans, or possibly through member States’ organs “fully seconded” to 
it) had effective control over that specific conduct’.9 
 
It follows that, in the absence of effective control over the impugned 
conduct by IOs, the nature of State’s organs of the troops sent in a 
peacekeeping operation remains the only ground for attribution. In 
other words, the status of the troops as organs – or agents – of IOs 
‘withdraws’ in favour of the status of the troops as organs of the TCS. 
In such a scenario, the consequence is that the only organic link 
surviving would be the one that exists between the troops and their 
sending States. This necessarily implies that the quality of the troops as 
TCS’ organs becomes exclusive and that the organic link that exists be-
tween the troops and the IO plays no role in the attribution; at this 
point, the very nature of the troops as organs of international organiza-
tions is challenged.10 
7 ibid. 
8 UNGA Res 56/83 Annex (28 January 2002) 2, art 4 Conduct of organs of a State. 
9 d’Argent (n 5) 29. 
10 According to Messineo, the application of such a strict interpretation of the ‘ef-
fective control’ standard ‘would mean that organs transferred from States could never 
temporarily become organs or agents of an international organization, thereby creating 
an institutional link with the IO, because a factual link with the IO would need to be 
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I have doubts on this interpretation. The organic link between the 
troops and the international organization should not be severed because 
the IO does not exercise effective control. The troops are in fact placed 
in the military structure of the IO. This institutional dimension should 
be considered as it is in the context of Article 8 ARIO, which attributes 
to an international organization ultra vires acts of its organs or agents 
while acting in their ‘official capacity and within the overall functions of 
the organization’.11 
The UN has always maintained the position that the command and 
control structure of the organization is the decisive factor in the attribu-
tion of conduct, thus assuming that, in principle, any conduct should be 
attributed to the UN.12 In fact, it is undeniable that States’ contingents 
are formally placed under the authority of the UN as the command and 
control structure is settled by the organization itself.13 In addition, the 
troops are normally considered organs of the organization, being for-
mally incorporated into its institutional framework. This is the case of 
UN peacekeeping forces,14 but the same can be said for peacekeeping 
established every time before attribution could be transferred’. F Messineo, ‘Multiple 
Attribution of Conduct’, SHARES Research Paper 11 (2012) 41 available at 
<www.sharesproject.nl>. 
11 It has been argued that the rationale of art 8 ARIO is the institutional framework 
of the international organization, which is a relevant and decisive factor even if the or-
gans or agents act in contravention of specific order: F Salerno, ‘International Respon-
sibility for the Conduct of ‘Blue Helmets’: Exploring the Organic Link’, in M Ragazzi 
(ed), Responsibility of International Organizations. Essays in Memory of Sir Ian Brownlie 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2013) 422. This is applicable also in the context of peacekeeping op-
erations, as clarified in the ARIO Commentary, where the only exception is for the off-
duty personnel of peacekeeping missions. Report of the International Law Commission 
UN doc A/66/10 (n 2), 95, para 10. 
12 C Ryngaert, ‘Apportioning Responsibility between the UN and Member States in 
UN Peace-Support Operations: An Inquiry into the Application of the “Effective Con-
trol” Standard after Behrami’ (2012) 45 Israel L Rev 160. 
13 It is to be borne in mind that in fact a transfer of authority from the troop con-
tributing state to the international organizations is in place, even if states retain some 
powers. This is uncontested and differentiates UN led operations from UN authorized 
operations. See PC Cammaert, B Klappe, ‘Authority, Command and Control in United 
Nations-led Peace Operations’, in T Gill, D Fleck (eds), The Handbook of International 
Law of Military Operations (OUP 2010) 260, para 6.15. 
14 M Zwanenburg, Accountability of Peace Support Operations (Martinus Nijhoff 
2005) 37. See also, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2 of the 
Charter) (Advisory opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 151, 176. 
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missions established by other IOs, such as the EU.15 Hence, if a rebut-
table presumption exists, it is in favour of the attribution to the IO, not 
to TCS.16 
The critique of the ‘reciprocal’ approach overturns this construc-
tion. It is based on the assumption that the troops are still States’ organs 
‘unless it can be convincingly established that the UN […] had effective 
control over that specific conduct’. This appears to be a presumption of 
exclusive attribution to the lending States, which ‘pops up’ when the 
IOs do not exercise effective control. 
This presumption apparently echoes the judgment rendered by the 
UK House of Lords in the Nissan case. In that case, it was affirmed that 
UK troops put at the disposal of the UN in the context of UNFICYP 
operation ‘remain[ed] in their own national service’;17 hence, their con-
duct was attributed to the UK. Several scholars harshly criticised the 
Nissan case as the House of Lords based its decision on the assumption 
that States exercise their exclusive authority over troops sent in UN 
peacekeeping operations.18 According to Hirsch, Nissan was wrong be-
cause it failed to apply the effective control test, which, in his view, 
could have suggested a different result in the determination of the entity 
to whom the impugned conduct had to be attributed.19  
One should not go too far by saying that the paper by Pierre 
d’Argent shares the same rationale. Actually, his paper is based on the 
application of the effective control standard to the IO, while the House 
of Lords affirmed the sovereignty rights of the UK over its troops with-
15 For a discussion on the institutional status of the troops sent into EU military op-
erations see A Sari, RA Wessel, ‘International Responsibility for EU Military Opera-
tions: Finding the EU’s Place in the Global Accountability Regime’, in B Van Vooren, S 
Blockmans, J Wouters (eds), The EU’s Role in Global Governance. The Legal Dimension 
(OUP 2013) 134-136. 
16 See accordingly A Sari, ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations and Article 7 ARIO: The 
Missing Link’ (2012) 9 Intl Organizations L Rev 83. 
17 Attorney Gen v Nissan, [1970] AC 179 (HL 1969) (appeal taken from AC), Opin-
ion of Lord Pearce, 209. 
18 RCR Siekmann, National Contingents in United Nations Peacekeeping Forces 
(Springer 1991) 144. 
19 M Hirsch, The Responsibility of International Organizations towards Third Par-
ties. Some Basic Principles (Martinus Nijhoff 1995) 76. This Author affirmed that a cor-
rect application of the effective control standard would have pushed the House of 
Lords to attribute the conduct to the UN. 
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out making any inquiry into the degree of control exercised by the UN 
in Cyprus.20  
However, the ‘unilateral’ application of the effective control stand-
ard to the IOs leads to the same result of nullifying the organic link be-
tween the organization and the troops, thus endangering the unity of a 
peacekeeping operation and the authority of IOs in the command and 
control structure. This situation, as we will see in the next paragraph, 
does not reflect the complex institutional framework of peacekeeping 
operations.  
 
 
3. The necessity of a ‘reciprocal’ reading of article 7 ARIO 
 
Although the organic link between the troops and the IOs is a factor 
in the attribution of conduct in peacekeeping operations, it is accepted 
that TCS normally retain ‘full and exclusive strategic level command 
and control of their personnel and equipment’.21 This is not only be-
cause TCS normally exercise disciplinary powers and criminal jurisdic-
tion over their troops:22 in peacekeeping operations, TCS exert a certain 
degree of influence over the conduct of the troops they lend to IOs.23  
Against this background, the presumption in favour of the attribu-
tion to the IOs can be challenged by a number of factors, which are 
very frequent in the practice of peacekeeping operations. I will try to 
summarise them outlining two possible scenarios: the ‘extreme’ and the 
‘common’ one. 
In the ‘extreme’ scenario, the troops on the ground receive direc-
tions and orders directly from their national authorities rather than the 
20 See accordingly A Di Blase, ‘Sulla responsabilità internazionale per attività 
dell’ONU’ (1974) 57 Rivista di diritto internazionale 265. 
21 Cammaert, Klappe (n 13) 159, para. 6.16. 
22 As noted by the International Law Commission in its Commentary to art 7 ARIO: 
Report of the International Law Commission UN doc A/66/10 (n 2), 87, para. 1. 
23 See, in this regard, T Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of Effective Con-
trol into a System of Effective Accountability: How Liability Should be Apportioned for 
Violations of Human Rights by Member State Troop Contingents Serving as United 
Nations Peacekeepers’ (2010) 51 Harvard Intl L J 149-151 and all the references there-
in. 
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IOs.24 This is particularly so in cases of 'cutting-across orders' – which 
are instructions given by national authorities to ignore or to go against 
orders provided by the IO – or in cases where TCS withdraw their 
troops from an international mission.  
In this scenario, it is clear that the control exercised by the TCS 
over their troops discontinues the chain of command of the IO. An in-
vestigation into the conduct of TCS is therefore necessary to assess the 
exclusiveness of the control exercised over the troops and to rebut the 
presumption of exclusive attribution to the IO.   
Nothing in this construction suggests that the conduct of national 
contingents is attributed to the States because of their nature as States’ 
organs to the detriment of their nature as organs or agents of the IOs. 
In the Nuhanovic case, there exists no dictum of the Dutch Courts in 
which the organic link between Dutchbat and the UN is considered to 
be severed. On the contrary, the Court explicitly mentioned in several 
passages that Dutchbat was still formally placed under the authority of 
the UN and that the individuals involved performed a ‘double role’ as 
organs of the Netherlands and of the UN.  
Even if we consider a less peculiar scenario – the ‘common’ one – 
we have a complex machinery in which the IOs and the TCS cooperate 
in the decision-making process of a military operation.25  
This does not necessarily imply that national orders cut across the 
chain of command of the IO. National orders can be shared with the IO 
or adopted in the institutional framework of the organization.26 Con-
24 As it was in the Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira case before the Tribunal de premiere 
istance de Bruxelles: see Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira and ors v Belgium and ors, First in-
stance judgment, RG No 04/4807/A, 07/15547/A, ILDC 1604 (BE 2010) (Court of 
First Istance, 8 December 2010) para 37-38. 
25 See for instance G Bartolini, Lo status del personale delle forze armate italiane ope-
rante in missioni all’estero e in contesti di cooperazione militare (il Sirente 2012) 21-23. 
Ryngaert (n 12) 165: ‘States have always retained a measure of control over and, even 
more, have micro-managed the troops they second to the UN, a situation which has 
been tolerated by the UN as long as the command structure is not impeded’. 
26 A German Administrative Tribunal discussed a similar scenario with regard to 
the conduct of a German vessel involved in the EU operation Atalanta. In that case, a 
national decision based on the EU/Kenya agreement on the transfer of suspected pi-
rates was adopted in the framework of an EU military operation. See Verwaltung-
sgericht Köln, Judgment 11 November 2009, case no 25 K 4280/09 available at  
<www.justiz.nrw.de>; see also A Nollkaemper, ‘German Court Finds the Transfer of 
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versely, orders stemming from an IO can be influenced by national ca-
veats or adopted after intense consultations with the TCS.27 To sum up: 
it is perfectly possible that the IO and the TCS mutually agree decisions 
and orders in a peacekeeping operation. 
It follows that we would always – or, at least, often – have a certain 
degree of control exercised by the IO and the TCS over a specific con-
duct even if an order stems from one entity only. In this ‘common’ sce-
nario, the control exercised over the troops is never exclusive as the 
conduct of TCS and IOs are necessarily interwoven.  
It is therefore a matter of the degree of control rather than one of 
exclusiveness. Article 7 ARIO should be interpreted accordingly, so as 
to allow an investigation into the intensity of the control exercised by 
the IO and the TCS.28 This proposition is supported by the ILC, ac-
cording to which the exercise of exclusive control by the IOs is not even 
required by Article 7 ARIO because it ‘does not concern the issue 
whether a certain conduct is attributable at all to a State or an interna-
tional organization’.29 
The Nuhanovic case is a paradigmatic example of such a practice. 
The State of  the Netherlands was found to have both normative and 
factual control over the disputed conduct in a case in which the Nether-
lands and the UN were both engaged in a decision making process on 
the evacuation of the compound.30  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks  
 
In conclusion, the ‘reciprocal’ approach is functional to avoid a pre-
sumption of exclusive attribution to the TCS, which would undermine 
the status of the troops as organs or agents of IOs. If a presumption ex-
Somali Pirates to Kenya to Be in Violation of Germany’s Obligations Under Interna-
tional Law’ (2011)  available at <www.sharesproject.nl>. 
27 C Leck, ‘International Responsibility in United Nations Peacekeeping Opera-
tions: Command and Control Arrangements and the Attribution of Conduct’ (2009) 10 
Melbourne J Intl L 14. 
28 See L Gradoni, ‘L’alto rappresentante per la Bosnia-Erzegovina davanti alla Cor-
te europea dei diritti umani’ (2008) 91 Rivista di diritto internazionale 633-634.  
29 Report of the International Law Commission UN doc A/66/10  (n 2), 88, para 5. 
30 A Nollkaemper, ‘Dual Attribution: Liability of the Netherlands for Conduct of 
Dutchbat in Srebrenica’, (2011) 9 J Intl Criminal Justice 1150. 
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ists, it should instead be in favour of the institutional framework of the 
IOs.  
An inquiry into the exercise of effective control by the TCS is need-
ed if one wishes to challenge this presumption, especially when national 
orders sever the chain of command of the IOs. It seems that this is nec-
essary even when the chain of command is not discontinued, as IOs and 
TCS always share orders and decisions in the complex decision-making 
process of a peacekeeping operation. 
The ‘reciprocal’ approach allows a more in depth investigation into, 
and a better understanding of, the bricolage institutionnel31 involved in a 
peacekeeping operation. That is why, I believe, Article 7 ARIO should 
be read as the Dutch courts (Court of Appeal and Supreme Court) cor-
rectly did in the Nuhanovic case. 
 
 
31 A definition coined in J M Sorel, ‘La responsabilité des Nations Unies dans les 
opérations de maintien de la paix’ (2001) 3 Intl L Forum 138. 
 
 
